Autoepistemic logic is an important formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning originally intended to model an ideal rational agent reflecting upon his own beliefs. Fuzzy autoepistemic logic is a generalization of autoepistemic logic that allows to represent an agent's rational beliefs on gradable propositions. It has recently been shown that, in the same way as autoepistemic logic generalizes answer set programming, fuzzy autoepistemic logic generalizes fuzzy answer set programming as well. Besides being related to answer set programming, autoepistemic logic is also closely related to several modal logics. To investigate whether a similar relationship holds in a fuzzy logical setting, we firstly generalize the main modal logics for belief to the setting of finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants Ł c k , and secondly we relate them with fuzzy autoepistemic logics. Moreover, we show that the problem of satisfiability checking in these logics is NP-complete. Finally, we generalize Levesque's results on stable expansions, belief sets, and "only knowing" operators to our setting, and provide a complete axiomatization for a logic of "only knowing" in the Ł c k framework.
Introduction
Since its introduction in the 1980s, autoepistemic logic [1] [2] [3] has been one of the main formalisms for nonmonotonic reasoning. It extends propositional logic by offering the ability to reason about an agent's (lack of) beliefs. In autoepistemic logic, beliefs are represented by sets of sentences in a propositional language augmented by a modal operator B. If ϕ is a formula, then Bϕ, which has to be interpreted as "ϕ is believed", is a formula as well. Note that in this language nested modal operators are allowed; it is possible to have beliefs about beliefs. Autoepistemic logic is nonmonotonic because conclusions made on the basis of incomplete information can be revised when new information becomes available. For instance, in autoepistemic logic we can express that "If I do not believe p, then q is true." If p cannot be inferred, q can be derived, but when p is added to the set of premises, q can no longer be derived. Originally, autoepistemic logic was intended to model the beliefs of an ideal rational agent [1] , by means of the so-called stable expansions. These are the deductively closed sets of beliefs that an ideal rational agent can have based on a particular set of premises A. Formally, given a set of autoepistemic formulas A, a set of autoepistemic formulas E A is a stable expansion of A if
where denotes derivability in classical propositional logic, and each formula Bϕ is considered as a new propositional variable (e.g. B(a ∧ Bb) is a variable but a ∧ Bb is the conjunction of the variables a and Bb). Using the definition of a stable expansion, it is easy to see that autoepistemic logic is nonmonotonic. Indeed, consider a set of premises A = {¬Bp → q} and suppose there exists a stable expansion E A . Since there is no reason to have p ∈ E A , it follows that ¬Bp ∈ E A and thus q ∈ E A . If p is added to the premises: A = {¬Bp → q, p}, then Bp ∈ E A for a stable expansion E A and thus q / ∈ E A . In [4] , a corresponding possible-world-like semantics is proposed. In particular, if we consider a set of propositional variables V , truth values are defined relatively to a pair (I, S) where S is a subset of classical interpretations in = 2 V , representing the agent's beliefs (i.e. the agent's epistemic state), and I ∈ is a particular interpretation intuitively corresponding to the "actual world". Note that, in contrast to the approach from [5] , the approach from [4] does not require that I ∈ S, in which case S models belief rather than knowledge. In fact, the pair (I, S) can be regarded as a pointed S5 Kripke model (with accessibility relation R = S × S) in case I ∈ S, or as a pointed KD45 Kripke model in case I / ∈ S. It is then shown that these semantics are in one-to-one correspondence with the stable expansions as originally defined in [1] .
In [6] , Levesque's logic of only knowing is introduced as an extension of autoepistemic logic to enable the modeling of expressions of the form "ϕ is all that is believed", i.e. there are no other relevant beliefs, but ϕ. To this end, the language is expanded with a second modal operator O. For every formula ϕ, Oϕ reads "ϕ is all that is believed" or "only ϕ is believed". In [6] it is then shown that stable expansions correspond to a particular type of valid sentences in this logic. Finally, a sound and complete axiomatization based on classical K45 modal logic is provided by pointing out that Oϕ can be rewritten as Bϕ ∧ N¬ϕ where the modal operators N and B are both K45 operators. In particular, Bϕ corresponds to "ϕ is believed" and N¬ϕ to "at most ¬ϕ is believed to be false". Hence Oϕ corresponds to "at least and at most ϕ is believed", i.e. "exactly ϕ is believed".
Logic programming had a significant impact on the development of some nonmonotonic logics and vice-versa (e.g. [7] ). In particular, Gelfond and Lifschitz [8] showed that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the answer sets of an answer set program and the stable expansions of a corresponding autoepistemic theory. Hence, answer sets also correspond to valid sentences in logic of only knowing. Recently, a fuzzy generalization of autoepistemic logic has been defined in [9] . In the same paper, it has also been shown that the important relation between autoepistemic logic and answer set programming is preserved: the answer sets of a fuzzy answer set program (e.g. [10] ) can be equivalently determined by computing the stable fuzzy expansions of a corresponding set of fuzzy autoepistemic formulas.
In this paper, in order to model the notion of belief on fuzzy propositions, we introduce generalizations of the main classical propositional modal logics of belief (K45, KD45, S5) based on finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants. Throughout this paper, we will denote the k + 1 valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants as Ł c k . For technical reasons we only consider truth degrees belonging to a finite scale S k = {0, [10] , (b): [8] , (c)-(d): [9] , (e): [6] .
and the Baaz-Monteiro projection operator is definable in Ł c k . Moreover, note that all operations that are definable in (k + 1)-valued Gödel logic are definable in (k + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logic as well. Hence the choice for Łukasiewicz logic ensures some level of generality. Another possibility would be to consider BL [11] , extended with the Baaz-Monteiro projection, but then the connectives lack a clear numerical interpretation.
Then, we show how fuzzy autoepistemic logic can also be characterized in terms of a possible worlds semantics intimately related to the Kripke models underlying the semantics of the Ł c k -variants of K45, KD45, and S5. We will show NP-completeness for two variants of the satisfiability problem. Finally, we also consider the extension of many-valued autoepistemic logic with an "only knowing" operator O and show that the relationship between stable expansions, belief sets and "only knowing" operators [6] naturally extends to our framework. As in the classical case we show that formulas of the form Oϕ can be rewritten as Bϕ ∧ N¬ϕ where B and N are many-valued K45 modalities. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic of only knowing and show that stable fuzzy expansions correspond to valid sentences in this logic. In particular this implies that the answer sets of a fuzzy answer set program correspond to valid sentences in this logic.
A summarizing diagram of embeddings and generalizations with references can be found in Fig. 1 . This paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, in Section 2, we recall some necessary preliminaries on the (k + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants Ł c k , and some results on the minimal modal logic over Ł c k . In Section 3, we define proper generalizations of the classical modal systems K45, KD45 and S5 and prove soundness and completeness with respect to appropriate Kripke-style semantics. In the same section, we also introduce a (possibly exponential) reduction for satisfiability from fuzzy to classical modal logics. In Section 4, we deal with the complexity of these logics and prove NP-completeness for two variants of the satisfiability problem. Then, in Section 5, we consider possible world semantics for the fuzzy autoepistemic logic of [9] and provide a characterization of stable fuzzy expansions both in terms of many-valued K45 belief sets, and in terms of proper generalizations of stable sets. In Section 6, we generalize the propositional fragment of Levesque's "only knowing" logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization, and we characterize stable fuzzy expansions in terms of the belief sets involving the "only knowing" operator O. We conclude with related works and some final remarks.
Background

Finitely valued Łukasiewicz logic with truth constants
Let L be the propositional language whose formulas are built from a countable set of propositional variables V , the binary connective → (implication), and truth constants c for each c ∈ S k = {0,
Further connectives are defined as follows:
with φ and ψ arbitrary formulas. A propositional evaluation is a mapping e : V → S k that extends to formulas in the following manner. If φ and ψ are formulas and c is an element in S k , then e(φ → ψ) = e(φ) ⇒ e(ψ) and e(c) = c,
The set of all such evaluations will be denoted by k . Notice that, in particular, for every formula φ and ψ and for every e ∈ k , we have
A formula φ is said to be satisfiable if there exists an e ∈ k such that e(φ) = 1. In such a case we say that e is a model of φ and e is a model of a set of formulas T if e is a model of every formula in T . A tautology is a formula φ such that e(φ) = 1 for each e ∈ k . A formula φ is a semantic consequence of a set of formulas , written as | φ, if it holds that every model of is also a model of φ.
This logic based on the language L, which we will denote by Ł c k , has a sound and a strongly complete axiomatization, see e.g. [12] for details. In particular, the axioms of Ł c k are
and the only deduction rule is modus ponens (from φ and φ → ψ infer ψ ). Axioms (Ł1)-(Ł4) form an alternative axiomatization for Łukasiewicz logic, and in axioms (Ł5) and (Ł6), nϕ is an abbreviation for ϕ ⊕ . . . ⊕ ϕ (with n repetitions of ϕ) and ϕ n for ϕ ⊗ . . . ⊗ ϕ (n repetitions of ϕ). From axiom (Q1) -the so called bookkeeping axiomwe derive the canonical interpretation for truth constants. Let denote the deducibility relation in Ł c k . Then, as usual, a formula ψ can be derived from a set of formulas T , written T ψ , if there exists a finite sequence of formulas whose last member is ψ and for which every element in the sequence is either (i) an instantation of an axiom in Ł c k , (ii) an element in T , or (iii) a formula derived from previous elements in the sequence by modus ponens. The following result, which is considered to be folklore of the field, can be easily proved as a direct consequence of [13] and [14, Corollary 3.4] .
Theorem 1 (Strong completeness). Let T ∪ {ψ} be an arbitrary set of formulas of Ł
A formula ψ that can be proven from the axioms of Ł c k and modus ponens is called a theorem; in this case we will write ψ.
For each formula φ we will denote by φ the formula φ ⊗ . . . ⊗ φ (with k repetitions of φ). Since we only have k + 1 truth values this formula is Boolean. Indeed, it is easy to check that for every e ∈ k ,
Note that corresponds to the well-known Baaz-Monteiro projection operator which was introduced independently by Monteiro [15] and Baaz [16] . In semantical terms, a many-valued formula φ is transformed to a Boolean one φ which is false whenever φ is not fully true. In other words, if we consider a formula as a fuzzy set of evaluations v φ (e) = e(φ), then the operator takes only the core of this fuzzy set.
Minimal modal logic over Ł c k
The minimal modal language L B we will consider in the paper is obtained by adding the modal operator B denoting "belief" to the language L. Our approach is based on previous theoretical work [17] on fuzzy modal logics where the truth values are taken from a finite residuated lattice. In [17] , among other logics, the authors introduce the minimal modal logic over Ł c k . A semantics for L B can be defined w.r.t. Kripke models of the form M = (W, e, R) where W is a countable set of possible worlds, e : W × V → S k is a mapping giving an evaluation of variables e(w, ·) : V → S k for each possible world w ∈ W , and R ⊆ W × W is a (two-valued) accessibility relation on possible worlds. Given a Kripke model M = (W, e, R) and a world w ∈ W , the truth value of a formula φ in L B is inductively defined as follows:
The definition of Bψ M,w intuitively expresses that the belief degree of ψ in a world w ∈ W coincides with the minimum truth degree that ψ takes in every world which is accessible from w. A formula φ is said to be satisfiable if there exists a Kripke model M = (W, e, R) and a w ∈ W such that φ M,w = 1. In such a case we say that M is a model of φ. A set of formulas T is satisfied by a Kripke model M if every formula in T is satisfied by M. It is called a tautology if for each Kripke model M = (W, e, R) and for each w ∈ W we have φ M,w = 1. A formula φ is a semantic consequence of a set of formulas , written as | B φ, if ψ M,w = 1 for all ψ ∈ , for all Kripke models M = (W, e, R) and for all w ∈ W implies φ M,w = 1 for all Kripke models M = (W, e, R) and for all w ∈ W . Now, let us consider the logic BŁ c k whose axioms are:
and whose rules are modus ponens (from φ and φ → ψ infer ψ) and necessitation for B (if φ is a theorem then Bφ is a theorem as well). Axioms (B2) and (K) are typical axioms in normal modal logics. Axioms (B3) and (B4) basically reflect the semantics of the operator B (an infimum over worlds) on constants and on the Łukasiewicz strong disjunction. (B3) could be roughly read as stipulating that one believes that the truth value of φ is at least c iff one believes at least to the degree c that φ is true. In other words, this axiom tells us how graded belief has to be interpreted. (B4) can be understood as expressing that the operator B is commuting with any increasing unary connective of the logic. Note that if we define •ϕ := ϕ ⊕ ϕ, then axiom (B4) could be simply expressed as B • ϕ ↔ •Bϕ; and the same holds for • ϕ := ϕ ⊗ ϕ. The axiom c ↔ Bc is again a graded generalization of a standard KD45 axiom, which expresses that one believes tautologies B and does not believe falsehoods ¬B⊥. Our generalization expresses that the truth constant c is believed to degree c.
In [17] , the authors show that this axiomatization is sound and complete w.r.t. the above class of Kripke models that will be denoted M.
Fuzzy modal logics of belief: extensions of BŁ c k
When defining logics of belief, it is common to require a number of properties of the modal operator B which do not follow from the axioms of BŁ c k . For instance, it is common to presume that the agent has both positive and negative introspective capabilities. This is captured in the classical case by the well-known axioms (4) and (5) . Belief consistency is captured by axiom (D). Finally, when dealing with knowledge instead of beliefs modal axiom (T) can be added. In this paper, we will consider extensions of BŁ c k which are obtained by adding some or all of these classical axioms.
As in the classical case [18, 19] , we consider the following extensions of BŁ c k : (4) and (5), (4) and (5), (4) and (5).
We will denote by L the notion of proof for any of the logics
The next task is to prove completeness of these logics 4 with respect to corresponding classes of many-valued Kripke models.
As was done for (fuzzy) autoepistemic logic [1, 9] , we will sometimes consider a formula φ in L B as a B-free formula φ * by treating subformulas of the form Bψ as new propositional variables. For instance, B(a ∧ Bb) is then seen as a fresh variable p B(a∧Bb) and has in principle no connection to Bb. Formally, consider the propositional language L * built from variables V * = V ∪ {p Bφ | φ ∈ L B }, truth constants in S k and the connective →. We define the translation function (·) * from L B to L * in the following manner: p * = p, c * = c, (φ → ψ) * = φ * → ψ * and (Bφ) * = p Bφ (with p Bφ a new variable). For a set of formulas A, we define A * = {ψ * | ψ ∈ A}. The set of all propositional evaluations e : V * → S k will be denoted by * k . As a first step, we show a relation between proving a formula ψ in one of the modal extensions of BŁ c k and proving the corresponding B-free formula ψ * ∈ L * from a suitable theory in the propositional logic Ł c k (but over the set of variables V * ).
Lemma 1. Let L be any of the logics K45(Ł
The proof of Lemma 1 is based on the fact that a proof in L can be translated into a proof in Ł c k and vice versa. The set L represents the set of (·) * -translations of modal theorems of L. As the following example illustrates this set is needed to convert a proof in L to a proof in Ł c k . 4 We restrict ourselves to the logics K45(Ł c k ), KD45(Ł c k ) and S5(Ł c k ), but completeness results could be obtained in a similar way for any of the logics resulting from other combinations of the above axioms.
and by modus ponens we can then infer L Ba → B(b → a). Another application of modus ponens using Ba ∈ T then implies T L B(b → a).
On the other hand, if we consider
and by modus ponens and p B a ∈ T * we derive that T * ∪ L p B(b→a) .
We now define the canonical Kripke model for a given fuzzy modal logic L. We will use this Kripke model to show completeness in Theorem 2. The following definition applies to any logic L obtained by adding to the axioms of BŁ c k combinations of the axioms (D), (4), (5) 
and (T) and hence in particular for
, where
We now introduce some subclasses of the class M of Kripke models (W, e, R) with two-valued accessibility relations, depending on which properties R satisfies. Recall that a relation R :
We then define the following subclasses of M.
• M et : class of Kripke models (W, e, R) with R Euclidean and transitive.
• M est : class of Kripke models (W, e, R) with R Euclidean, serial and transitive.
• M rsyt : class of Kripke models (W, e, R) with R reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
In order to prove the main result of this section, i.e. Theorem 2, we first need first to prove the following preliminary lemma. This lemma shows the relation between evaluations of formulas in the L-canonical Kripke model, and evaluations of the corresponding B-free formulas in Ł c k .
Lemma 2. (Truth-lemma) Suppose
Proof. By using the monotonicity for B and the distributivity of ∨ and ∧, the claim follows by an easy adaptation from Lemma 4.20 in [17] . 2
The following proposition collects basic properties of canonical Kripke models.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
in the corresponding subclass of Kripke models and a w ∈ W such that φ M,w < 1. We show that the L-canonical Kripke model meets this condition. The fact that each of these canonical Kripke models belongs to the correct subclass of M follows from Proposition 1 and from the fact that all reflexive and Euclidean relations are symmetric. By Lemma 1 it follows, independent of the choice of L, that L φ * and by the strong completeness of
As in the classical case (see e.g. [20] ), the logics K45(Ł c k ), KD45(Ł c k ) and S5(Ł c k ) admit simpler semantics while preserving soundness and completeness. Consider the following classes of Kripke models where W ×E is the mapping 
Proof. See Appendix A. 2
Finally, let us show that one can reduce reasoning in any of our many-valued modal logics to reasoning in classical modal logics. We show it for the basic modal logic BŁ c k . For each formula φ ∈ L B and truth value r ∈ S k consider the formula φ r ∈ L B defined as (φ ↔ r). This formula is a Boolean formula and for each Kripke model M = (W, e, R) in M and each w ∈ W we have φ r M,w = 1 iff
In the following lemma we will show that for each formula (φ ↔ r), for which we will use the short notation φ r , there exists some (φ r ) ∈ L B such that the truth values remain the same. 
Using Lemma 3 we then have the following reduction from BŁ c k to classical modal logic. 
Complexity of satisfiability problems
This section is concerned with the complexity of two satisfiability problems for KD45(Ł c k ). The results we will obtain also hold for K45(Ł c k ) and S5(Ł c k ) because the proofs we will show can easily be adapted to these cases. Let us define the following variants of the classical SAT-problem:
We will show that these problems are NP-complete which is the same complexity class as the corresponding decision problem for classical KD45 (see [20] for more details on the complexity of classical modal logics). Note that 1-SAT and pos-SAT can be polynomially reduced to each other. Indeed, a formula φ is "pos-SAT" if ¬ (¬φ) is "1-SAT" and a formula φ is "1-SAT" if φ is "pos-SAT". Hence it is sufficient to show the NPcompleteness of 1-SAT.
For any formula φ ∈ L B , we denote by #φ its length:
-#c = 1 for each c ∈ S k and #p = 1 for every p ∈ V .
-#(φ → ψ) = 1 + #φ + #ψ and similar for the other connectives.
-#(Bφ) = 1 + #φ.
For a formula φ ∈ L B , we denote by d(φ) its depth which is defined as usual by counting the nested occurrences of the modality B.
Example 3. Consider the formula φ = Ba ⊕ ¬b with a and b variables. Then
For ϕ and ψ propositional (i.e. B-free) formulas, we have: 
Proof. Consider a Kripke model M = (W, e, R) with
The aim is to find a finite set W , a non-empty subset E ⊆ W , a mapping e : W × V → S k and some w ∈ W for which the claim holds. Trivially, if φ is B-free, take W = E = {w}, R = W × E , w = w, and take e be defined by restricting e : 
Observe that the proof of Lemma 4 uses a procedure which, given a formula φ ∈ L B , a Kripke model M = (W, e, R) and a w ∈ W , outputs a B-free formula φ M such that M | φ if and only if φ M is 1-satisfiable in Ł c k . In particular, φ M is obtained by substituting each of the subformulas of the form Bψ in φ by the truth-constant r with r = Bψ M,w . Proof. Since each formula of Łukasiewicz logic is in particular a formula of L B , and since 1-SAT (as well as pos-SAT) for Ł c k is NP-complete, the NP-hardness of our problem follows. In order to prove NP-membership, recall that from Lemma 4 a formula φ is 1-SAT in a model M iff φ is 1-SAT in a finite model M whose cardinality is polynomial in the length of φ. Let us guess the model M = (W , e , R ) and let us also guess w ∈ W . Since |W | ≤ #φ, these guesses are polynomial in #φ. Let φ M be the formula of Ł c k obtained from M , w and φ applying the procedure described above. Notice that #φ M is polynomial in #φ. Moreover, since |W | ≤ #φ the formula φ M is obtained in a number of steps which is polynomial in #φ. From [21] it follows that checking if φ M is 1-SAT (pos-SAT) in Ł c k is in NP, and hence the NP-membership follows. 2 Remark 1. For each r ∈ S k , let us define the decision problem r-SAT in the following way:
"Given a formula φ, does there exist an M = (W, e, R) ∈ M s est and a w ∈ W such that φ M,w = r?"
It turns out that, for every r ∈ S k , r-SAT is NP-complete as well. Indeed, this problem is equivalent to 1-SAT for the formula (φ ↔ r) which is polynomial in φ. Hence NP-membership follows. NP-hardness follows from the fact that for each r > 0, 1-SAT can be reduced to r-SAT since a formula φ M,w = 1 iff φ ⊗ r M,w = r. For r = 0, we can reduce 1-SAT as follows:
Note that in [22] , it was shown that 1-SAT and pos-SAT for the minimal modal logic over Ł k with S k -valued accessibility relations are PSPACE-complete.
Relating fuzzy modal logic and fuzzy autoepistemic logic
The aim of Moore's autoepistemic logic [1] is to characterize the set of beliefs of a rational agent with introspection capabilities by means of a set of simple properties it must fulfill. The language of fuzzy autoepistemic logic is the same as L B , the modal logic with the belief operator B, so Bϕ is still read as "the agent believes ϕ". The basic construct is concerned with the notion of a stable expansion E of a set of initial beliefs A, briefly introduced in Section 1. It can be seen as the closed set of beliefs of an ideal rational agent reflecting on his own beliefs. In this section we first consider a many-valued generalization of the notion of stable expansions from [9] . Then we introduce a possible world semantics for the resulting many-valued stable expansions and we show their relation to the fuzzy modal logics studied in Section 3. Finally we establish a link to a graded generalization of Stalnaker's notion of stable belief sets.
Stable fuzzy expansions
The following semantic definition of stable fuzzy expansions has been introduced in [9] .
Definition 1.
A stable fuzzy expansion of a set of L B -formulas A is a fuzzy set E A : L B → S k that satisfies the following fixpoint condition:
Recall that E A (ψ) denotes the truth constant corresponding to the membership value of ψ in E A and that, for a formula φ ∈ L B , φ * is the corresponding B-free formula, see Section 3. Using the strong completeness of Ł c k , in particular the fact that for any set of Ł c k formulas T ∪ {φ} one has
and thus one can rewrite the above semantic definition of stable fuzzy expansion of A as a fuzzy set of formulas E A satisfying the following syntactic fixpoint condition:
Still, this condition can be equivalently rewritten as the following two joint conditions:
, and
Notice that φ ∈ E A if and only if E A (φ) = 1. In other words, E A is the core of the fuzzy set E A .
Possible world semantics for stable fuzzy expansions
Generalizing Moore's result [4] , it is shown in [9] that stable fuzzy expansions can also be characterized by a fuzzy Kripke-style possible world semantics. In particular, a fuzzy autoepistemic structure is a pair (w, S) with w ∈ k and S ⊆ k . Informally, w represents the actual world which is used to evaluate B-free formulas and S represents all worlds considered possible (i.e. epistemic states) and is used to evaluate formulas of the form Bψ . The class of such structures will be denoted by M ae . The degree of truth of an L B -formula φ relative to a fuzzy autoepistemic structure (w, S) is inductively defined as follows:
Intuitively, one can think of S as a set of possible worlds. Hence, the truth degree of Bϕ in S is equal to the minimal truth degree to which ϕ is considered to be true in all possible worlds. In other words, we can interpret the truth value of Bϕ as the minimal truth value for ϕ which is supported by the agent's epistemic state.
Since the truth evaluation of formulas of the form Bϕ in a structure (w, S) does not depend on the actual world w, we will also write Bϕ S to denote Bϕ (w,S) . Note that, if S = ∅, then Bϕ S = 1. Also note that, conversely, the interpretation w in (w, S) is needed to evaluate non-modal formulas.
We consider the following subclasses of fuzzy autoepistemic structures of M ae :
• the class M ae e , where only pairs (w, S) with S non-empty are considered, • the class M ae in ⊆ M ae e , where only pairs (w, S) with w ∈ S are considered. 
Proof. We only show the case of KD45(Ł c k ). The other cases are obtained by slight adaptations of the proof. By Proposition 2 it is sufficient to show that M s est and M ae e have the same tautologies. First suppose there exists an M = (W, e, R) ∈ M s est (i.e. R = W × E and ∅ = E ⊆ W ) and w ∈ W such that φ M,w < 1. We show that for (e(w, ·), S) ∈ M ae e , where S = {e(w , ·) | w ∈ E}, we have φ (e(w,·),S) < 1. We will do this by showing that φ M,w = φ (e(w,·),S) . To obtain this result we will show by structural induction that for each formula γ and for each z ∈ W we have γ M,z = γ (e(z,·),S) . The only notable case is γ = Bα for which it holds that α M,v = α (e(v,·),S) for all v ∈ W (induction hypothesis). Now consider z ∈ W , we show that Bα M,z = Bα (e(z,·),S) .
where we use the fact that R = W × E and thus R(v, z) = 1 iff v ∈ E. Now to show the other direction. Suppose we have (v, S) ∈ M ae e such that φ (v,S) < 1 and define M = (W, e, R) ∈ M s est as follows: Let W be a set of worlds such that W has the same cardinality as S = {v} ∪ S. Hence there exists a bijection h : W → S : w → w . The mapping e : W × V → S k is defined as e(w, ·) = h(w) and we define R = W × E with E = {w ∈ W | h(w) ∈ S}. We show by structural induction that for each formula γ and each w ∈ W we have γ M,w = γ (h(w),S) . The only interesting case is γ = Bα such that α M,v = α (h(v),S) for each v ∈ W (induction hypothesis). But then we have for z ∈ W by the induction hypothesis that
In particular it then follows that
To summarize, Table 1 provides a list of the languages and corresponding logics and semantics that have been introduced and used so far.
In [9] the authors characterize stable fuzzy expansions in terms of the above many-valued possible-world semantics. Indeed, the fuzzy belief set induced by an agent's epistemic state S, denoted Bel S , is defined in the natural way: for each formula ϕ ∈ L B , the degree to which the belief in ϕ is supported by S is the truth-degree of Bϕ in S, that is, we define
Moreover, given a set of formulas A, a set of propositional evaluations S A is called a fuzzy autoepistemic model of A whenever
Intuitively, S A is the set of worlds or "sources" in which all formulas of A are true. Then the following result is proved in [9] .
Proposition 4. A fuzzy set of formulas E : L B → S k is a stable fuzzy expansion of a set of formulas A iff it is the belief set for some fuzzy autoepistemic model S A of A, i.e. E(φ)
Example 4. Here we present an example for fuzzy autoepistemic reasoning in a scenario involving sensor networks. Suppose we have a wireless sensor network consisting of devices that can sense their environment and communicate wirelessly, for instance with the purpose of detecting forest fires in an early stage. We will use fuzzy autoepistemic logic to determine whether there are sensors not working optimally.
Let t i be the variable representing the temperature measured by sensor i. Suppose we have an appropriate rescaling to assure that all variables take values in k and let e i be the variable representing the degree to which sensor i is faulty.
Let us define a new connective d(ϕ, ψ) 6 as ¬(ϕ ↔ ψ) for which the semantics is given by the Euclidean distanced: for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], d (x, y) = |x − y|. Then, for i = j , the formulas
d(t i , t j ) → (e i ∨ e j )
capture the idea that if the sensed values of two sensors t i and t j are different, this provides a reason to believe that at least one of those two sensors is faulty. Note that we assume that all sensors are physically close to each other and thus they should measure the same temperature.
On the other hand, the formula
represents the default information that sensors are not faulty. As a concrete case, we further assume we are told sensor e 2 is very reliable, and hence we believe that sensor e 2 is not faulty (B¬e 2 ), and that the three measured values are t 1 = 0.2, t 2 = 0.9, t 3 = 0.5. The formalization of this scenario then amounts to consider the following theory:
Let us see what a stable expansion E A of A must look like.
Suppose there exists a fuzzy autoepistemic model S of A. Then by definition it holds that
For every v ∈ S it must hold that B¬e 2 (v,S) = 1 and thus that inf w∈S (1 − w(e 2 )) = 1, i.e. that for all w ∈ S we have w(e 2 ) = 0. 
Moreover since ¬Be i (v,S) ≤ ¬e i (v,S) it follows that 1 − Be i (v,S) ≤ 1 − e i (v,S) and thus v(e i ) ≤ Be i (v,S) = inf w∈S w(e i ). Since for every v ∈ S we also have inf w∈S w(e i ) ≤ v(e i ), we obtain
Using the definition one can now easily show that S is indeed a fuzzy autoepistemic model of A. In particular, it has to be shown that
or in other words, if w = v, then α (w,S) < 1 for some α ∈ A. The corresponding stable expansion E A : L B → S k is such that E A (Be 1 ) = E A (e 1 ) = 0.7, E A (Be 2 ) = E A (e 2 ) = 0 and E A (Be 3 ) = E A (e 3 ) = 0.4.
Fuzzy stable sets
On the other hand, as in the classical case, we can also characterize fuzzy belief sets, and a forteriori stable fuzzy expansions, by the following graded version of syntactical Stalnaker's notion of stable set of formulas (cf. [20] ).
Definition 2. Let : L B → S k be a fuzzy set of formulas and let
We say that is a fuzzy stable set if the following conditions hold:
The conditions (1)-(4) in Definition 2 are the graded counterparts of the classical ones in [20] . In particular, condition (3) expresses that fuzzy stable sets are closed by the belief operator B, i.e. ϕ belongs to as much as Bϕ does. On the other hand condition (4) expresses a kind of graded closed world assumption for fuzzy stable sets: Bϕ is not believed (in the sense of belonging to ) iff ϕ is not in the set .
Proposition 5. is a fuzzy stable set iff is a fuzzy belief set for some non-empty epistemic state. In other words, is a fuzzy stable set iff = Bel S for some S = ∅.
Proof.
(⇐) First we show that a fuzzy belief set is a fuzzy stable set. By definition of fuzzy belief set we know that there exists a ∅ = S ⊆ k such that (ϕ) = Bϕ S for each formula ϕ. In order to show that ˆ is propositionally consistent, by the strong completeness of Ł c k , it is sufficient to show that there exists a v ∈ * k such that for each formula ϕ we have (ϕ) ≤ v(ϕ * ). Indeed, it then follows that for each ϕ we have v( (ϕ) → ϕ * ) = 1 and thus v(α) = 1 for all α ∈ˆ . Let w ∈ S be arbitrary but fixed and define v such that v(ϕ * ) = ϕ (w,S) for each ϕ. It follows that
which proves (1). Next, assume that ˆ c → ϕ * , or by strong completeness of Ł c k that ˆ | c → ϕ * . We show that (ϕ) ≥ c. Note, similar as above, that for each w ∈ S we have that v with v(ψ * ) = ψ (w,S) for all ψ ∈ L B is a model of ˆ and hence of c → ϕ * . Therefore c ≤ ϕ (w,S) for each w ∈ S and c ≤ inf w∈S ϕ (w,S) = (ϕ) which proves (2). Proving (3) follows easily by noting that
Finally, to show (4), observe that (¬Bϕ) equals
which is equal to 1 − (ϕ). (⇒) Now, let be a fuzzy stable set. Define S * = {u ∈ * k | u(α) = 1, ∀α ∈ˆ }. Note that S * is nonempty by (1) . We show that for each ϕ and S = {u |V | u ∈ S * } = ∅ 7 we have
First, note that for a formula ϕ we have by definition of S * that w( (Bϕ) → (Bϕ) * ) = 1, or w((Bϕ) * ) ≥ (Bϕ), for each w ∈ S * . By (3) it then follows that w((Bϕ) * ) ≥ (Bϕ) = (ϕ) for each w ∈ S * . We show that also w((Bϕ) * ) ≤ (ϕ) from which it then follows that
Hence by (4) it follows that w((Bϕ) * ) ≤ (ϕ).
We will now use the fact that
for each w ∈ S * to show that for each formula α and each w ∈ S * we have w(α * ) = α (w |V ,S) from which we can conclude that
for each formula ϕ and an arbitrary w ∈ S * . We show w(α * ) = α (w |V ,S) by structural induction. The only notable case is α = Bψ . By the definition of S * we have (ψ) ≤ u(ψ * ) for all u ∈ S * and hence
Now suppose that (ψ) < inf u∈S * u(ψ * ), i.e. for each u ∈ S * we have (ψ) < u(ψ * ). Since the set of truth values is finite there exists a v ∈ S * such that v(ψ * ) = min u∈S * u(ψ * ). Hence for all u ∈ S * we have v(ψ * ) ≤ u(ψ * ) and thus u(v(ψ * ) → ψ * ) = 1. By the strong completeness of Ł c k and the definition of S * it follows that
By (2), it then follows that (ψ) ≥ v(ψ * ). Since v ∈ S * it follows that (ψ) < v(ψ * ) and thus that (ψ) > (ψ), a contradiction. Hence (ψ) = inf u∈S * u(ψ * ) and by the induction hypothesis we conclude that
By combining Propositions 4 and 5, we can easily derive the following list of properties that fuzzy stable expansions satisfy. Note that it would be more difficult to check these properties directly from the definition of fuzzy stable expansions.
Proposition 6. Let A be a set of L B -formulas. If E A is fuzzy stable expansion of A, then the following properties hold:
Proof. First of all, by Propositions 4 and 5 it follows that E A is a fuzzy stable set. Then, (i) is the trivial consequence of E A being (propositionally) deductively closed and containing A, (ii) and (iii) directly follows from the definition of E A , while (iv) and (v) are just translations from analogous properties of fuzzy stable sets from Proposition 5. 2
This last proposition confirms that many natural properties that one would expect to hold for fuzzy stable expansions are indeed satisfied. Firstly, (i) shows that all propositional consequences of the initial beliefs in A will belong (to degree 1) to any fuzzy stable expansion of A, i.e. E A contains at least all the logical consequences of A. Properties (ii) and (iii) state that an agent fully believes a formula of the kind r → φ iff he/she believes φ at least to degree r and if he/she does not fully believe s → φ to a higher degree s, then the degree of belief in φ should be exactly r. Finally, (iv) and (v) state that beliefs are closed by iterating B and by a closed world assumption principle.
"Only knowing" operators and stable fuzzy expansions
Let us extend L B with a modal operator O where a formula Oψ will be interpreted as "ψ is all that is believed". We denote this language by L O . In the classical case [6] , the semantics for a corresponding logic is defined as follows. Given an epistemic state S consisting of a set of classical evaluations, a formula Oψ is true in S whenever ψ is true in any structure (z, S) with z ∈ S, and false in any structure (z , S) with z / ∈ S. We can straightforwardly generalize this condition to the many-valued case by defining
where now w ∈ k and S ⊆ k . Other formulas are evaluated as in fuzzy autoepistemic logic. If we then add another modal operator N whose truth evaluation in a pair (w, S) is
then it is easy to see that the semantics of Oψ is exactly that of Bψ ∧ N¬ψ . Notice that Nψ (w,S) = Bψ (w, k \S) . Hence by Theorem 4 it follows that N is another K45 "operator". Again, since the truth value of Oψ (and Nψ ) in a structure (w, S) does not depend on w, we will also write Oψ S and Nψ S to denote Oψ (w,S) and Nψ (w,S) respectively.
There is an intuitive link between the operator N and the guaranteed possibility function of [23] . However, there are some clear differences as well. Here we consider crisp accessibility relations over graded worlds, whereas [23] considers graded accessibility relations (encoded by possibility distributions) between Boolean, i.e. classical, worlds. The fact that only knowing can be understood as the conjunction of belief (necessity) and guaranteed possibility was already pointed out in [24] in a classical context.
To summarize, the language L O we consider is built from propositional variables in V , truth constants {r | r ∈ S k }, the connectives from Łukasiewicz logic and modal operators B, N and O. We evaluate formulas using the class of semantical structures M ae = {(w, S) | w ∈ k , S ⊆ k }. The truth of a formula φ ∈ L O relative to a structure (w, S) is inductively defined as follows: ψ (w,S) ⇒ γ (w,S) ).
Note that we actually use a partition of the worlds in two subsets: the set S is used for the semantics of B and its complement k \ S for the semantics of N.
As in the classical case [6] , we will provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the fuzzy logic of "only knowing", which we will denote as O(Ł c k ). Specifically, O(Ł c k ) has the following axioms:
(i) axioms of Ł c k , (ii) axioms of K45(Ł c k ) for both B and N, (iii) φ → Bφ, where all variables and constants in φ occur in the scope of an operator N or B, (iv) φ → Nφ, where all variables and constants in φ occur in the scope of an operator N or B, (v) ¬Bφ ∨ ¬Nφ, if ¬φ is satisfiable and does not contain any modal operator, (vi) Oφ ↔ (Bφ ∧ N¬φ), and the following inference rules: modus ponens and necessitation rules for N and B.
Axioms (iii)-(vi) are many-valued versions of the ones proposed by Levesque in [6] . For axioms (iii) and (iv), the idea is to capture the fact that the truth value of a truth constant or any formula ϕ starting by a modality B or N in a model (w, S) depends only on S and not on the particular interpretation w. Hence, that value will also coincide with the value of Bϕ or Nϕ, since they are the infimum of identical values. In other words, together with axiom (4), they specify that we can avoid nested beliefs (in the general sense of B, N and O). The intuition behind axiom (v) is the following. Since a propositional formula φ that is not a tautology cannot be true to degree 1 in all possible worlds, an agent cannot believe φ in a given epistemic state S and believe φ in the complementary epistemic state k \ S. Actually one can check that in our fuzzy framework all the above axioms are tautologies and the rules preserve tautologies in every structure (w, S) ∈ M ae . In particular, we have the following result.
Lemma 5. The axioms (i)-(vi) are sound w.r.t. the class of structures M ae .
Proof. Axioms (i) and (ii) follow from previous results.
Axioms (iii) and (iv) are easy to check. It only has to be shown that these axioms are tautologies for formulas of the form φ = Bα and φ = Nα. Indeed by truth functionality we then obtain that these axioms are tautologies for formulas where all variables and constants occur in the scope of an operator N or B. For axiom (iii), (w, S) ∈ M ae and φ = Bα we have
The other cases follow similarly.
For axiom (v), suppose ¬φ is satisfiable, i.e. there exists w * ∈ * k such that w * (φ) = 0. For a structure (w, S) ∈ M ae we then have ¬Bφ ∨ ¬Nφ (w,S) = 1 iff max( ¬Bφ (w,S) , ¬Nφ (w,S) ) = 1 iff Bφ (w,S) = 0 or Nφ (w,S) = 0 iff there exists z ∈ S such that z(φ) = φ (z,S) = 0 or there exists z / ∈ S such that z(φ) = φ (z,S) = 0. This is satisfied by the fact that there exists
Similarly as in Section 3, we can show that there exists a reduction of the satisfiability problem for the fuzzy logic of only knowing to the classical counterpart. For every structure (w, S) ∈ M ae we then have 
Lemma 6. Given a formula φ ∈ L O and a truth value r ∈ S k , there exists a formula (φ r ) ∈ L O such that for each structure (w, S) ∈ M ae it holds that
where φ r is a short notation for the formula (φ ↔ r) with φ ∈ L O .
Proof. This lemma can be shown in a similar way as in the proof of Lemma 3. In particular the claim now also has to be checked for formulas of the form Nφ which can be done entirely analogously as for formulas of the form Bφ. 2
We will use this lemma together with the following proposition to show that the proposed axiomatization is complete w.r.t. the proposed semantics. In Proposition 7 and Theorem 5, besides the languages L O and L O and structures M ae , we also consider the following languages: and the following classes of semantic structures: (w,S) . Hence, in both cases we obtain → φ (w,S) = 1. Next we show that → φ , with
By the definition of , it then holds that for each p ∈ V there exists exactly one r p ∈ S k such that ŵ(p r p ) = p r p (ŵ,Ŝ) = 1. We will now show that there exists a (w, S) ∈ M ae + such that φ (ŵ,Ŝ) = φ (w,S) and such that (w,S) = 1. Since → φ is a tautology in M ae + we then obtain that φ (ŵ,Ŝ) = 1. To do this, we first define a mapping f : In the following theorem we will show completeness for O(Ł c k ) w.r.t. M ae .
Theorem 5. Every tautology in M ae is a theorem in O(Ł c k ).
Proof. Suppose φ is a tautology in M ae . Trivially, φ 1 = φ is a tautology as well and by Lemma 6, it follows that (φ 1 ) ∈ L O constructed analogously as in Lemma 3 is also a tautology. By Proposition 7 it then follows that there is a proof for (φ 1 ) in O(Ł c k ). We will now show that this implies that there also exists a proof for φ in O(Ł c k ). We will do this by showing that for each ϕ ∈ L O and for each r ∈ S k it holds that ϕ r = (ϕ ↔ r) is provably equivalent to (ϕ r ) as constructed in Lemma 3, i.e. that O(Ł c k ) proves ϕ r ↔ (ϕ r ) . In particular, this implies that (φ 1 ) and φ 1 = φ are provable equivalent formulas. Since by Proposition 7, (φ 1 ) is a theorem in O(Ł c k ) it then follows that φ and hence φ is a theorem as well.
Let us show by induction that for each ϕ ∈ L O and for each r ∈ S k it holds that ϕ r = (ϕ ↔ r) is provably equivalent to (ϕ r ) . The only non-trivial step in this proof is to show that there exists a (Bα r ) ∈ L O provably equivalent to (Bα ↔ r) given that the claim holds for α. The case of N can be proved analogously. First note that if r < 1, Ł c k proves that (Bα ↔ r) is equivalent to
where r + is the successor of r. Now using axioms (B2)-(B4) and the fact that B(ϕ ⊗ ϕ) ↔ Bϕ ⊗ Bϕ, and hence B ϕ ↔ Bϕ is a theorem of K45(Ł c k ), the following expression can be derived from (Bα ↔ r).
By the induction hypothesis, there exists for each t ≥ r a formula (α t ) ∈ L O that is equivalent to (α ↔ t). Therefore, (Bα ↔ r) is equivalent to
If, on the other hand r = 1, then we have to show that Bα is equivalent to B α. As previously mentioned, this is a theorem of KD45(Ł c k ). 2
Finally, we show that the relationship between the "only knowing" operator O and Moore's stable expansions proved in [6] naturally extends to our framework. The next proposition shows that the belief set Bel S for an epistemic state defined by a set of Ł k -evaluations S is indeed a stable fuzzy expansion of a premise ϕ whenever ϕ is all what is fully believed in the epistemic state S.
This proposition can easily be generalized to stable fuzzy expansions of sets of formulas.
Proof. Since for a formula ψ we have Oψ S = min( Bψ S , N¬ψ S ), we have the following chain of equivalences: The next lemma proves interesting properties about graded beliefs the only knowing operator O captures inside the (monotonic) many-valued modal logic O(Ł c k ) related to similar features of the (non-monotonic) fuzzy autoepistemic logic. We recall that a propositional formula ϕ is r-satisfiable, for r ∈ S k , if there exists an evaluation w ∈ k such that w(ϕ) = r.
Proposition 9.
If ϕ is a propositional formula and r-satisfiable for some r ∈ S k , then O(Ł c k ) proves the following formulas:
(i) Obviously, ϕ is r-satisfiable iff φ is 1-satisfiable, and since φ is Boolean, by axiom (v) of the logic O(Ł c k )
k we can derive that the following formula is a theorem in O(Ł c k ):
Since by axiom (B3),
is a theorem, (i) is proved.
(ii) follows by observing that Oφ is equivalent to Bφ ∧ N¬φ, and hence Oφ → Bφ is a theorem, i.e. B (r ↔ ϕ).
is a theorem in O(Ł c k ). Since B(r → ϕ) is equivalent to r → Bϕ by axiom (B3), we obtain that
Example 5. We now present an alternative encoding for the scenario in Example 4 using the "only knowing" logic. If we let 
and hence by the semantics of the operator B we obtain for all v ∈ S and for all φ ∈ A that φ (v,S) = 1 and hence that φ (v,S) = 1. The same computations as in Example 4 imply that this is only possible if
To obtain that S is a fuzzy autoepistemic model of A, it remains to be shown that
Or in other words, it has to be shown that for all w / ∈ S there exists φ ∈ A such that φ (w,S) < 1. Suppose this is not the case and there exists w / ∈ S such that for all φ ∈ A it holds that φ (w,S) = 1. Since for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} we have ¬Be i → ¬e i (w,S) = 1 it follows that w(e i ) ≤ inf z∈S z(e i ) = v(e i ). Since w = v there exists j ∈ {1, 3} such that w(e j ) < v(e j ) and w(e 2 ) = 0. If j = 1, since 0.7 → e 1 ∨ e 2 w,S = 1, we obtain w(e 1 ) < v(e 1 ) = 0.7 ≤ w(e 1 ∨ e 2 ) = w(e 1 ), a contradiction. For j = 3 we obtain a similar contradiction.
Related work
Many-valued modal logics have appeared in the literature under different forms and contexts. In [25, 26] , a modal logic with truth values in finite Heyting algebras is introduced. These modal systems are then used for dealing with opinions of experts with a dominance relation among them. Other papers mainly offer theoretical frameworks. For instance, in the last years there has been some work on fuzzy modal logics with generalized Kripke semantics, see e.g. [17] . In particular, in [17] , they systematically investigate many-valued modal logics over a residuated lattice, dealing with accessibility relations that can take values in this lattice as well as relations taking only values and ⊥ in the lattice. In the current paper we have focused on modal systems based on a finite set of linearly ordered truth values with Łukasiewicz logic semantics for connectives which generate the class of finite MV-algebras [21] . These systems represent a good compromise between expressive power and nice logical properties. The infinitely-valued case offers some problems, see e.g. [27] where infinitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic is extended with a modality and the results involve an infinitary deduction rule. Another example is the case of S5 with total accessibility relations [28] . In that paper the fact that formulas are in correspondence with formulas of the monadic fuzzy predicate calculus is used to propose a sound and complete axiomatization by interpreting the modality as "∀". However, for KD45 and K45 this trick does not work since in these cases the modality cannot be interpreted in such a way. On the other hand, a closely related work is Maruyama's paper [29] , where modal logics for belief based on a finitely-valued Heyting algebra of truth values which means that the truth values are not necessarily linearly ordered, are considered. The formalization is very similar, but he also deals with common belief. Here we rather focus on providing a formal basis for the fuzzy generalization of autoepistemic logic developed in [9] .
Autoepistemic logic is among the most extensively studied nonmonotonic formal systems and is known to be equivalent to several other modal nonmonotonic reasoning systems such as the logic of only knowing [6] and is closely related to default logic [30] . Besides in [9] , many-valued extensions of autoepistemic logic have also been addressed by e.g. Fitting [31] in the context of finite Heyting algebras of truth values. The latter is actually an extension of the earlier mentioned work in [25, 26] to the nonmonotonic setting. Reflexive autoepistemic logic has almost identical semantic characterizations of stable expansions as autoepistemic logic but defines the modality so that it models knowledge rather than belief. It can also be used to characterize the semantics of ASP [32] and has been generalized in [33] using finite Heyting algebras.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have introduced Hilbert-style axiomatizations for fuzzy modal logics of belief as well as for a "logic of only knowing" based on finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic. In particular, we have introduced generalizations of the main classical propositional modal logics of belief (K45, KD45, S5) in order to model the notion of belief on fuzzy propositions, in the sense of admitting partial degrees of truth between 0 (fully false) and 1 (fully true). We have shown that their Kripke style semantics can also be used to provide a possible world semantics for fuzzy autoepistemic logic, in line with the original work of Moore [4] . We have also developed a fuzzy version of Levesque's (propositional) logic of "only knowing", proving soundness and completeness, and in particular we have generalized bridges with autoepistemic logic established in [6] for the classical case by characterizing fuzzy stable expansions in terms of models of suitable "only knowing" formulas.
The paper also leaves some interesting open problems to be dealt with in future developments. A first question is considering whether fuzzy accessibility relations instead of crisp ones would make the approach significantly more general. From an application point of view, keeping accessibility relations crisp makes it easier to interpret the truth degree of a formula. If we would have fuzzy accessibility relations in addition to graded truth, the truth degree of a formula Bφ depends on the degree to which φ is believed and on how certain we are of that belief. Also, note that crisp accessibility relations seem to be sufficient for practical purposes, and in particular for making the link with fuzzy autoepistemic logic in the sense of [9] and fuzzy answer set programming in the sense of [10] . On the other hand, it also seems interesting to consider fuzzy accessibility relations e.g. under the form of a possibility distribution on the set of worlds, since this would allow us to consider scenarios in which beliefs can be both graded and uncertain. Another type of generalization that may be interesting to look at would be to start from other logics than finitely-valued Łukasiewicz logic. Although, if one wants to remain in a finitely-valued framework, (k + 1)-valued Łukasiewicz logic seems to be the best choice regarding the expressive power, unless one prefers a purely ordinal level. In this case one could use Gödel caculi and related logics, possibly equipped with an extra involutive negation. Moving to infinitely-valued logics, in particular to the [0, 1]-valued Łukasiewicz logic Ł, may bring technical difficulties as Ł is not strongly complete for arbitrary sets of premises, an important property in our current approach. and w ∈ W are given. Define E = {v ∈ W | R(w, v) = 1}. By the seriality of R we have E = ∅. We define M as follows: W = {w} ∪ E, e : W × V → S k : (w, p) → e(w, p) and R = W × E.
Notice that for any v ∈ E we have E = {z ∈ W | R(v, z) = 1}. Indeed, for every z ∈ E we have R(w, z) = 1 and since R is Euclidean and R(w, v) = 1 (because v ∈ E) it follows that R(v, z) = 1 as well, and hence E ⊆ {z ∈ W | R(v, z) = 1}. On the other hand, since R is transitive, if R(v, z) = 1, then since R(w, v) = 1 it follows R(w, z) = 1 and thus z ∈ E, and hence {z ∈ W | R(z, v) = 1} ⊆ E. Therefore, E = {z ∈ W | R(v, z) = 1} for all v ∈ E.
We will now use this result to show by structural induction that for each ψ ∈ L B it holds that ψ M,v = ψ M ,v for every v ∈ E. The only notable case is when ψ = Bα, but this follows by the fact that E = {z ∈ W | R(v, z) = 1} for all v ∈ E and by the hypothesis:
where we use that R = W × E.
We will use this last result to show that ψ M,w = ψ M ,w for all ψ ∈ L B . In particular, it then follows that φ M ,w = φ M,w < 1. We will show this by structural induction. Again, the only notable case is when ψ = Bα: Proof. We show this lemma by induction on the structure of the formula.
• If φ = p ∈ V , then we can choose (φ r ) = (p ↔ r).
• 
